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The Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act'
(ISDEAA) requires the federal government to enter into a "self-
determination" contract with any Native American tribe that requests
one. A self-determination contract gives the tribe funding for pro-
grams and allows it to provide services previously administered by the
federal government. Such a contract gives the tribe the amount that
the government would have spent to plan, conduct, and administer the
program itself.3 In addition, the federal government must provide the
tribe funding for "contract support costs," the additional transaction
costs incurred by a Native American tribe endeavoring to plan, con-
duct, and administer its own programs without the government's help.'
Contract support costs can be either start-up costs in the case of initial
contracts, or continuous costs of running a program in the case of on-
going contracts.
Funding for self-determination contracts derives from moneys
appropriated by Congress for the Indian Self-Determination Fund.
Congress appropriates funding for the Indian Self-Determination
Fund in the appropriation act applicable during the year that the con-
tract is to be completed. Funding under the ISDEAA is not unlimited.
In § 450j-1(b), the ISDEAA specifically provides for two funding limi-
tations: (1) the Availability Clause provides that funding for self-
determination contracts is subject to the availability of appropria-
t B.A., M.A. 2001, University of Pennsylvania; J.D. 2004, The University of Chicago.
I Pub L No 93-638,88 Stat 2203 (1975), codified as amended at 25 USC § 450 et seq (2000).
2 The words "Native American" will be used to refer to the tribes who benefit from the
ISDEAA, and the word "Indian" will only be used when reference to original text demands.
3 See 25 USC § 450j-l(a)(1) ("The amount of funds provided under the terms of the self-
determination contracts entered into pursuant to this subchapter shall not be less than the ap-
propriate Secretary would have otherwise provided.").
4 See Ramah Navajo Chapter v Lujan, 112 F3d 1455, 1461 (10th Cir 1997) (holding that
"contract support costs" encompassed "indirect costs" incurred by a tribal organization in carry-
ing out a self-determination contract). "Indirect costs" are defined in the ISDEAA as those "in-
curred for a common or joint purpose benefiting more than one contract objective." 25 USC
§ 450b(f). Indirect costs contrast with "direct program costs," which are those "that can be identi-
fied specifically with a particular contract objective." 25 USC § 450b(c).
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tions,' and (2) the Reduction Clause provides that funding to one tribe
need not be reduced to make funding available for another tribe.6
The ISDEAA and its underlying policy of self-determination re-
placed the policy of termination that was implemented in the 1950s.7
Before the 1950s, the federal government controlled the planning and
administration of all programs intended to benefit Native Americans,
without any Native American involvement.8 The goal of termination
was to assimilate Native American people into American culture, tak-
ing away their tribal independence and cultural identity.9 The IS-
DEAA, however, aims to cultivate independence and leadership
within the Native American tribal communities."
Courts applying and interpreting the ISDEAA have split over
how far to push the federal government's obligation to provide con-
tract support costs to Native American tribes that have entered into
self-determination contracts. A simple hypothetical illustrates the
problem. Assume that the Cherokee tribe contracted in 1996 with the
federal government to build an alcohol abuse center, for a contract
cost of $2, for use by the Cherokee's members. Assume that the
amount appropriated for Indian self-determination in total for 1996
was $10 for self-determination contracts and $100 for contract support
costs." The Cherokee tribe then demands from the federal govern-
ment, in addition to $2 in contract costs, $90 in contract support costs,
an amount representing 90 percent of the total amount appropriated
for contract support costs for all self-determination contracts entered
into in 1996. In addition to contracting with the Cherokee tribe, as-
sume that the government also contracted with three other tribes-
the Apache, Iroquois, and Seminole-in separate self-determination
contracts identical to the one entered into with the Cherokee tribe.
Each of these tribes, like the Cherokee, demands in addition to the $2
in contract costs, contract support costs of $90. The total amount ap-
5 25 USC § 450j-l(b) ("Notwithstanding any other provision in this subchapter, the provi-
sion of funds under this subchapter is subject to the availability of appropriations.").
6 Id ("[T]he Secretary is not required to reduce funding for programs, projects, or activi-
ties serving a tribe to make funds available to another tribe.").
7 Consider Michael C. Walch, Note, Terminating the Indian Termination Policy, 35 Stan L
Rev 1181, 1181, 1196-97 (1983) (noting that although "the Indian Self-Determination Act...
purport[s] to repudiate the termination policy," elements of the termination policy remain in ef-
fect); Richard TrudeU, Indian Tribes as Sovereign Governments Part I at 24-25 (American Indian
Resource Institute 1988).
8 See Walch, Note, 35 Stan L Rev at 1181--84 (cited in note 7).
9 See id at 1184-85,1188-90.
10 See 25 USC §§ 450(a), 450a(a) (restating the congressional statement of findings and
statement of policy behind the ISDEAA).
I The amounts used in this hypothetical are deflated significantly, for simplicity, and do
not represent the actual amounts appropriated for Indian self-determination. The actual
amounts will be discussed in Part III.
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propriated for contract support costs, $100, falls $260 short of the total
amount demanded by Native American tribes, which is $360.
The Federal Circuit, in Thompson v Cherokee Nation of Okla-
homa2 (Thompson II), held that the ISDEAA requires the govern-
ment to provide Native American tribes with the full amount of con-
tract support costs, or $360 in the simple illustration above." By con-
trast, the Tenth Circuit, in Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma v Thomp-
son" (Thompson I), and the Ninth Circuit, in Shoshone-Bannock
Tribes of the Fort Hall Reservation v Department of Health and Hu-
man Services," held that the ISDEAA does not require the govern-
ment to provide Native American tribes with the full amount of con-
tract support costs if the provision of such amount exceeds the
amount appropriated for contract support costs in the applicable ap-
propriation act." The Ninth and Tenth Circuits held that demands in
excess of the amount appropriated for contract support costs would
be met on a first-come, first-serve basis, in accordance with the proce-
dure prescribed by the ISDEAA itself. In the hypothetical above, if
the Cherokee tribe requests money first, it would receive the full $90,
leaving only $10 available to the other tribes.
This split between the Ninth, Tenth, and Federal Circuits has two
distinct layers. The ISDEAA operates through two pieces of legisla-
tion: an authorizing act and an appropriation act.'7 The authorizing act
is the ISDEAA itself." However, the ISDEAA requires an appropria-
tion act to effect the actual disbursement of money to Native Ameri-
can tribes with whom the federal government contracts." The first
layer of the split centers on a disagreement about the language in an
appropriation act, while the second layer of the split centers on rival
interpretations of the ISDEAA itself.
The first layer of the circuit split involves the meaning of the
phrase "shall remain available until expended" when that phrase ap-
pears in an appropriation act authorized by the ISDEAA. The Federal
12 334 F3d 1075 (Fed Cir 2003).
13 Id at 1087-94.
14 311 F3d 1054 (10th Cir 2002).
15 279 F3d 660 (9th Cir 2002).
16 Thompson 1, 311 F3d at 1060-65; Shoshone-Bannock, 279 F3d at 665-67 (both finding
that the language of the ISDEAA would have required full funding only if sufficient funds had
been appropriated, and that such funds had not in fact been appropriated).
17 See General Accounting Office, 1 Principles of Federal Appropriations Law 2-33 (GAO
2d ed 1991), online at http://www.gao.gov/special.pubs/og91OO5.pdf (visited Sept 5, 2004). Effec-
tive July 7,2004, the General Accounting Office changed its name to the Government Account-
ability Office as part of the GAO Human Capital Reform Act of 2004, Pub L 108-271, 118 Stat
811. For the sake of consistency with older sources that are cited below, this Comment refers to
the agency under its old name.
'8 25 USC § 450j-1(b).
19 Id.
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Circuit in Thompson H held that this phrase did not constitute a statu-
tory cap or a limit on funding of contract support costs; therefore it
did not excuse the federal government from providing the full amount
of contract support costs to Native American tribes who were parties
to self-determination contracts governed by the appropriation act
containing that phrase.2° The Ninth and Tenth Circuits, in contrast, held
that "shall remain available until expended" did constitute a statutory
cap in an appropriation act authorized by the ISDEAA.2 The courts
concluded that the statute excuses the federal government from pro-
viding contract support costs to Native American tribes in excess of
the amount appropriated.
In the second layer of this circuit split, courts have disagreed
about how to interpret the ISDEAA, the authorizing act, in conjunc-
tion with the "shall remain available until expended" language found
in the appropriation bills. This phrase speaks directly to § 450j-1(b) of
the ISDEAA, which excuses the federal government from providing
funds under two circumstances: when appropriations are not available,
or when funding fully would reduce funding for other tribes' contract
support costs. Thus, the collateral effect of the holdings in the first
layer of the split is to create another related layer of disagreement be-
tween the Federal Circuit and the Ninth and Tenth Circuits on how to
interpret the ISDEAA itself. By refusing to recognize a limit on the
amount of funding that the government must provide, the Federal
Circuit effectively held that § 450j-l(b) is inconsistent with the rest
of the ISDEAA," whereas the Ninth and Tenth Circuits held that
§ 450j-l(b) limits the government's obligations under the ISDEAA.23
This Comment argues that the position articulated by the Ninth
and Tenth Circuits is the preferable resolution to both layers of the
split. The purpose of the entire statutory scheme and the plain text of
the statute dictate that § 450j-l(b) should be read as consistent with
the rest of the ISDEAA provisions. Part I sets forth the purpose un-
derlying the ISDEAA by explaining the difference in the relationship
between the federal government and Native American tribes before
and after the ISDEAA. Part II explains how the ISDEAA operates as
an authorization act in conjunction with appropriation acts that it has
20 Thompson 1H, 334 F3d at 1089-90 ("[T]he 'shall remain available' language ... certainly
did not constitute a statutory cap excusing the Secretary from fulfilling his obligations under the
availability clause of section 450j-1(b).").
21 Thompson 1, 311 F3d at 1064-65 (stating that "a better reading of the ['shall remain
available'] language is that Congress intended to limit the amount available for new or expanded
[contract support costs]"); Shoshone-Bannock, 279 F3d at 666-67 (holding that the "subject to
availability" language was clear and unambiguous in its limiting of funds to those made available
by the relevant appropriation act).
22 Thompson H, 334 F3d 1075.
23 Shoshone-Bannock, 279 F3d at 667; Thompson 1,311 F3d at 1065-66.
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authorized. Part III discusses both layers of the split: first, the effect of
specific appropriation act language, and second, the proper interpreta-
tion of the ISDEAA's limitation clauses in § 450j-1(b). Finally, Part IV
draws upon the purpose and operation of the ISDEAA to argue that
§ 450j-1(b) excuses the federal government from providing contract
support costs in excess of an amount indicated in an appropriation act.
I. THE PURPOSE BEHIND THE ISDEAA
To understand how the ISDEAA operates, the backdrop against
which it was enacted deserves consideration. The ISDEAA was en-
acted to improve the relationship between the federal government
24and Native American tribes. Before the ISDEAA, the federal gov-
ernment assumed the role of guardian of Native American tribes."
This role involved repeated efforts to assimilate Native Americans
into American culture, first by heavily supervising tribes," and later by
instituting the "termination policy."27 The loss of tribal status disrupted
the Native American community enormously: unemployment levels
rose sharply, education levels declined, and many Native Americans
became welfare recipients and lost their homes. Through the termina-
24 See Trudell, Indian Tribes as Sovereign Governments Part I at 14-15 (cited in note 7)
(discussing the legislative action taken by Congress during the 1960s through the 1980s, including
the ISDEAA).
25 See Walch, Note, 35 Stan L Rev at 1181-84 (cited in note 7).
26 For example, the General Allotment Act of 1887, ch 119, 24 Stat 388 (1887), codified at
25 USC § 331 et seq (1996), repealed by Pub L No 106-462, 114 Stat 2007 (2000), called for al-
lotments, usually of 160 acres, to be given to individual Indians, thereby ending tribal holdings of
land, and also called for the sale to non-Indians of reservation land not allotted to Indians. Con-
gress believed that governing allotments of land in this way would expedite the process of Indian
assimilation. See Walch, Note, 35 Stan L Rev at 1182-83 n 10. Indian assimilation remained a
goal in 1934, when the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) was enacted. See Indian Reorganiza-
tion Act, Pub L No 73-383, 48 Stat 984 (1934), codified at 25 USC §§ 461-79 (2000). Among
other provisions, the IRA halted sales of reservation land to non-Indians and offered economic
incentives for developing reservation resources. See Walch, Note, 35 Stan L Rev at 1183, citing
25 USC §§ 464-66, 469-70. The purpose of the IRA was to "rehabilitate the Indian's economic
life and to give him a chance to develop the initiative destroyed by a century of oppression and
paternalism." Mescalero Apache Tribe v Jones, 411 US 145, 152 (1973), quoting Readjustment of
Indian Affairs, HR Rep No 1804, 73d Cong, 2d Sess 6 (1934). Indian tribal governments were still
heavily controlled by non-Indians under the IRA since the Secretary of the Interior retained ap-
proval over tribal constitutions, bylaws, and corporations. See 25 USC §§ 476(d), 477.
27 On August 1, 1953, Congress adopted House Concurrent Resolution 108, which "de-
clared it to be the policy of the United States to abolish federal supervision over the tribes as
soon as possible and to subject the Indians to the same laws, privileges, and responsibilities as
other citizens of the United States." HR Con Res 108, 67 Stat B132 (Aug 1, 1953). This policy
aroused strong Indian opposition. See Francis Paul Prucha, ed, Documents of United States In-
dian Policy, Document 147 at 234 (Nebraska 2000). House Concurrent Resolution 108 declared
that "at the earliest possible time, all of the Indian tribes and the individual members thereof ...
should be freed from Federal supervision and control and from all disabilities and limitations
specially applicable to Indians." HR Con Res 108,67 Stat at B132.
28 See Walch, Note, 35 Stan L Rev at 1189-90.
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tion policy, the federal government acted as a trustee for Native
American tribes.2' The federal government planned and built pro-
grams for Native American tribes, such as hospitals, schools, and
community centers.) After the building of a program was completed,
the federal government relinquished its control of the program.31 After
the forced termination of the trusteeship between the federal gov-
ernment and the Native American tribe, the Native American tribe as-
sumed responsibility for the program's operation and maintenance. 2
President Richard Nixon's Message on Indian Affairs to Con-
gress, delivered on July 8, 1970, addressed the state of Indian relations
and voiced his adamant opposition to the policy of termination and its
harmful consequences." President Nixon's message is thought to have
spearheaded the enactment of the ISDEAA)4 Nixon argued that the
system of forced termination was deeply flawed, because under that
system Native American tribe beneficiaries were subject to the whim
of the federal government, who could "discontinue [its] responsibility
on a unilateral basis whenever it [saw] fit."'" Moreover, forced termi-
nation produced "considerable disorientation" among Native Ameri-
can tribe beneficiaries, to the extent that these tribes could not "relate
to" the assistance efforts made on their behalfM A better system,
Nixon urged, would eradicate that "suffocating pattern of paternal-
ism" by channeling funds to Native American tribes to create and op-
erate their own community-building programs. 3 Nixon recommended
that Congress effectuate a policy of "self-determination without ter-
mination," a policy that would foster a strong "sense of autonomy"
along with a strong "sense of community" for Native American
tribes.-
Just a few years after Nixon's speech, Congress drafted the origi-
nal version of the ISDEAA. Congress designed the first iteration of
the statute to assist Native Americans in becoming active participants,
29 See Richard Nixon, Special Message to the Congress on Indian Affairs, in Public Papers
of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon 1970 564,565-66 (GPO 1971).
30 See id at 567 ("[Tlhe United States Government would continue to carry out its treaty
and trusteeship obligations to [the Indian tribes] as long as the groups themselves believed that
such a policy was necessary or desirable.").
31 See id at 567-68.
32 See id at 567.
33 See id at 564-76.
34 See S. Bobo Dean and Joseph H. Webster, Contract Support Funding and the Federal
Policy of Indian Tribal Self-Determination, 36 Tulsa L J 349, 349 (2000) ("The federal policy of
Indian tribal self-determination ... was initiated by President Richard Nixon in his Message on
Indian Affairs to Congress in 1970 and implemented through the enactment of the [ISDEAA].")
(internal citation omitted).
35 Nixon, Special Message at 565 (cited in note 29).
36 Id at 566.
37 Id at 567-68.
38 Id at 564-67.
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rather than passive recipients, in the various federal programs oper-
ated for the exclusive benefit of Native Americans.39 The need "for
[Native Americans] to exercise greater control over Federal programs
and efforts conducted for their exclusive benefit" was recognized in
enacting the ISDEAA. So too was the need to develop "management
and professional skills required for [Native Americans] to enter into
immediate contracts ... for the control and management of their vari-
ous programs."' Subsequent amendments strengthened the leverage
of tribes to exercise self-determination rights through the provision of
contract support costs, which are the transaction costs a Native
American tribe would encounter when carrying out a self-
determination contract under the ISDEAA. 1
II. OPERATION OF THE ISDEAA
As with most statutes that involve federal funding, the ISDEAA
operates through two pieces of legislation: an appropriation authoriza-
tion act and an appropriation act. Appropriation authorization legisla-
tion authorizes the appropriation of funds to implement the function
of an agency.2 Generally, an agency's appropriation authorization leg-
islation does not give the agency any actual money to spend." An au-
thorization act is "basically a directive to the Congress itself which
Congress is free to follow or alter (up or down) in the subsequent ap-
propriation act.""
An appropriation is defined as "[a] legislative body's act of set-
ting aside a sum of money for a public purpose."45 However, the ap-
39 See Indian Self-Determination Act of 1972, S Rep No 92-1001,92nd Cong, 2d Sess 2.
40 Id.
41 See Dean and Webster, 36 Tulsa L J at 350 (cited in note 34). As amended in 1988, the
ISDEAA includes a provision mandating the addition of contract support costs to the amount
that the Secretary was required to provide to fund self-determination contracts. See ISDEAA
Amendments of 1988, Pub L No 100-42,102 Stat 2285, codified at 25 USC § 450j-1(a)(2) ("There
shall be added to the amount required by [the contract itself] contract support costs."). This ver-
sion of the ISDEAA also contained a clause which stated that the contracting Secretary "shall
include in annual budget requests to the Congress a request for the funds necessary to provide
contract support costs," subjecting the provision of contract support costs on the Congress's re-
sponse to the Secretary's request for appropriations. See Amending the Indian Self-
Determination Act of 1974, and for Other Purposes, HR Rep No 99-761, 99th Cong, 2d Sess 3
(1986). Indian tribes' rights to receive contract support costs have expanded steadily since the
provision for them was made in 1988. In 1994, the contract support costs provision was amended
further to provide for the recovery of contract support funding as a "direct cost," so long as rec-
ommended by the Inspector General of the Department of the Interior. See Dean and Webster,
36 Tulsa L J at 362.
42 See General Accounting Office, 1 Principles of Federal Appropriations Law at 2-33
(cited in note 17).
43 Id.
44 Idat2-35.
45 Black's Law Dictionary 98 (West 7th ed 1999).
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propriation depends upon separate legislation to define the specific
public purpose for which it will be spent. "Generally, an appropriation
is thought of as the specification of an amount of money for a federal
agency or activity, while the range of actions on which the money may
be spent is defined in other legislation. 46 Only Congress is authorized
to make an appropriation. The Constitution states: "No money shall
be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations
made by Law.'47 Moreover, "no money can be paid out of the Treasury
unless it has been appropriated by an act of Congress."' Thus, every
federal agency is dependent upon Congress for its funding.9
The ISDEAA contains provisions that govern the general expen-
diture of money toward Native American programming, but it does
not specify a particular amount to be expended. An appropriation act
governs only for a specified period of time, typically one year,'° and
applies to all contracts entered into pursuant to the ISDEAA for that
period of time. Thus, the ISDEAA and a series of appropriation acts
operate in tandem to achieve the transfer of money from the Treasury
to Native American tribes.
This Part explains in detail the operation of the ISDEAA (which
is an appropriation authorization act), of appropriations law generally,
and of the specific appropriation acts authorized by the ISDEAA.
A. The ISDEAA: An Appropriation Authorization Act
The ISDEAA directs the Secretary of the Interior or the Secre-
tary of Health and Human Services (either of them, the "Secretary")
to enter into contracts for the operation of Native American programs
with any Native American tribe that requests to enter into such a con-
tract.' A Native American tribe is defined as "any Indian tribe, band,
nation, or other organized group or community ... [whose members
are] recognized as eligible for the special programs and services
provided by the United States to Indians because of their status as
Indians."'2
These contracts between the Secretary and Native American
tribes are called "self-determination contracts."'3 Self-determination
46 Kate Stith, Congress' Power of the Purse, 97 Yale L J 1343, 1352 (1988).
47 US Const Art 1, § 9, cl 7.
48 Cincinnati Soap Co v United States, 301 US 308,321 (1937).
49 See General Accounting Office, 1 Principles of FederalAppropriations Law at 1-3 (cited
in note 17) ("[A] federal agency may not make a payment from the United States Treasury
unless Congress has made the funds available.").
50 See id at 2-11.
51 See 25 USC § 450f(a)(1) ("The Secretary is directed, upon the request of any Indian
tribe by tribal resolution, to enter into a self-determination contract or contracts.").
52 25 USC § 450b(e).
53 25 USC § 450b(j).
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contracts provide for "the planning, conduct and administration of
programs or services which are otherwise provided to Indian tribes
and their members pursuant to Federal law."5 Prior to the enactment
of the ISDEAA, federal law required the federal government to plan,
conduct, and administer programs and services for Native American
tribes. The advent of self-determination contracts permitted tribes to
take control of those programs and services.
The programs and services that a self-determination contract may
cover include "hospitals, health clinics, dental services, mental health
programs, and alcohol and substance abuse programs.""5 Under this ar-
rangement, the Secretary would fund the projects, but the projects
would be planned, conducted, and administered by the Native Ameri-
can tribe.6
The amount of funding provided for self-determination contracts,
commonly referred to as the "secretarial amount,"" cannot be less
than the Secretary "would have otherwise provided for the operation
of the programs or portions thereof for the period covered by the con-
tract." '8 In addition to the secretarial amount, the Secretary must pro-
vide "contract support costs which shall consist of an amount for the
reasonable costs for activities which must be carried on by a tribal or-
ganization as a contractor to ensure compliance with the terms of the
contract."'9 Thus, contract support costs represent the transaction costs
incurred by a Native American tribe endeavoring to build and manage
its own program, rather than the government doing the same.
Retraction or modification of the amount of funding promised
through a self-determination contract is explicitly provided for by
§ 450j-l(b) of the ISDEAA. This provision allows the Secretary to al-
ter the amount in either of two scenarios corresponding to the Avail-
ability and Reduction Clauses that compose § 450j-1(b): (1) if funding
is unavailable, or (2) if providing funding for one self-determination
contract with one Native American tribe would necessitate the reduc-
tion of funds for another self-determination contract with another Na-
tive American tribe.'° The Availability Clause provides: "Notwithstand-
ing any other provision in this subchapter, the provision of funds un-
54 Id.
55 Thompson II, 334 F3d at 1081.
56 See 25 USC § 450j.
57 See Thompson 1, 311 F3d at 1056; Ramah Navajo School Board, Inc v Babbitt, 87 F3d
1338, 1341 (DC Cir 1996) (describing the secretarial amount as the "amount of funding that
would have been appropriated for the federal government to operate the programs if they had
not been turned over to the Tribe").
58 25 USC § 450j-l(a)(1).
59 25 USC § 450j-l(a)(2).
60 See 25 USC § 450j-l(b).
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der this subchapter is subject to the availability of appropriations."6'
The Reduction Clause provides: "[T]he Secretary is not required to
reduce funding for programs, projects, or activities serving a tribe to
make funds available to another tribe or tribal organization under this
subchapter."6 '
Every self-determination contract entered into under the ISDEAA
must either contain or incorporate by reference the provisions of a
model agreement prescribed by the ISDEAA, as set forth in § 4501(a).
A model agreement contains a reiteration of the Availability Clause,
specifically stating that the amount provided by the Secretary is "sub-
ject to the availability of appropriations.""
B. Appropriation Acts Generally
The two exceptions to funding for self-determination contained
in § 450j-1(b), the Availability and Reduction Clauses, have been ap-
plied where a Native American tribe has demanded funding from the
Secretary, in addition to the amount contracted for, to pay for contract
support costs such as overhead expenses resulting from managing a
health care program that the tribe took over from the government
pursuant to a self-determination contract."6 Such claimed overhead
expenses have, in the past, exceeded the amount appropriated for con-
tract support costs in the fiscal year the self-determination contract
was to be performed.65
The General Accounting Office66 (GAO) publishes Principles of
Federal Appropriations Law,6' which, though not binding on courts, 6
compiles expert opinions on which many courts (including the U.S.
Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit) have explicitly relied.6 The
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 25 USC § 4501(c) (describing § 1(b)(4) of the model agreement)-
64 These were the contract support costs demanded in Shoshone-Bannock. See 279 F3d at
663.
65 This situation occurred in the cases most relevant to this Comment: Thompson 11, 334
F3d at 1081-82 (addressing a claim that the government improperly failed to pay a tribe's over-
head costs of running health programs as per a self-determination contract); Thompson 1, 311
F3d at 1058-59 (addressing a claim for contract costs for new and expanded contracts, as well as
ongoing contracts, that the government had not paid due to "budget shortfalls"); Shoshone-
Bannock, 279 F3d at 663-64 (addressing a claim for overhead costs of a health care program that
was insufficiently funded by appropriations for the 1996 fiscal year). The difference between ini-
tial and expanded contracts and ongoing contracts will be explained in Part II.C.
66 The General Accounting Office is now referred to as the Government Accountability
Office. See note 17.
67 General Accounting Office, Principles of FederalAppropriations Law (cited in note 17).
68 See Thompson II, 334 F3d at 1084 (stating that, while "[the opinions of the GAO] are
not binding," they are expert opinions that should be carefully considered).
69 See, for example, Lincoln v Vigil, 508 US 182, 192 (1993) (relying on the GAO's Princi-
ples of FederalAppropriations Law in stating that "the very point of a lump-sum appropriation is
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GAO, an independent agency, is headed by the Comptroller Gen-
eral.7' The Comptroller General has the authority to "prescribe regula-
tions to carry out" her "duties and powers,"7 2 which include the inves-
tigation "of all matters related to the receipt, disbursement, and use of
public money" 3 and the analysis of the "expenditures of each execu-
tive agency the Comptroller General believes will help Congress de-





Over the years, certain forms of appropriation language have be-
come standard.7" Such standard language has particular significance to
Congress's desire to "earmark," or specifically designate part of a gen-
eral appropriation for a particular object. The upper limit of an
amount earmarked in an appropriation act is called a statutory cap.7
Statutory caps indicate to agencies that Congress has appropri-
ated limited dollars for the agency to spend on a particular program.
The Anti-Deficiency Act7 makes it unlawful for "an officer or em-
ployee of the United States Government ... [to] make or authorize an
expenditure or obligation exceeding an amount available in an appro-
priation."7 In this way, the Anti-Deficiency Act prevents monetary li-
abilities beyond the amounts that Congress has appropriated.79 Viola-
tion of the Anti-Deficiency Act by a government official constitutes a
criminal offense,' reinforcing the importance of clarity in appropria-
tions limitations.
The GAO has stated that "the most effective way to establish a
maximum ... earmark is by the words 'not to exceed' or 'not more
than.' . .. These are all phrases with well-settled plain meanings."8' Less
to give an agency the capacity to adapt to changing circumstances and meet its statutory respon-
sibilities in what it sees as the most effective or desirable way"). See also Thompson I, 334 F3d
at 1084-86 (noting that the "fundamental principles of appropriations law" espoused by the Su-
preme Court are drawn from, among other sources, the GAO's Principles of Federal Appropria-
tions Law).
70 See 31 USC § 702(a) (2000) ("The General Accounting Office is an instrumentality of
the United States Government independent of the executive departments.").
71 See 31 USC § 702(b).
72 31 USC § 711(1).
73 31 USC § 712(1).
- 31 USC § 712(3).
75 See General Accounting Office, 2 Principles of Federal Appropriations Law 6-4 (GAO
2d ed 1991), online at http://www.gao.gov/special.pubs/og91OO5.pdf (visited Sept 5,2004).
76 See id.
77 Pub L No 97-258,96 Stat 923 (1982), codified at 31 USC § 1341 (a) (2000).
78 31 USC § 1341(a)(1).
79 See Stith, 98 Yale L J at 1371 (cited in note 46).
80 See 31 USC § 1350 (providing that a violation of § 1341(a) can be penalized by a fine of
up to $5,000 and/or imprisonment for up to two years).
81 General Accounting Office, 2 Principles of Federal Appropriations Law at 6-8 (cited in
note 75).
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clear in meaning and less predictable in its function as part of an ap-
propriation bill in which it appears, the phrase "shall be available"
does less work when used without the "not to exceed" or "not less
than" modifiers." "Shall be available" and "shall remain available" are
synonymous phrases." The ambiguous "shall remain available" phrase
is therefore contingent upon words surrounding it in an appropriation
act, and for this reason it cannot be interpreted on its own to set a
minimum or maximum limit on funding, according to the GAO.'
"Shall remain available," without limiting words like "not less than,"
may not achieve a level of clarity that effectively prescribes limits in
excess of which an agency official cannot spend. The language may not
prevent the agency official from risking criminal liability pursuant to
the Anti-Deficiency Act."
According to the Comptroller General, "When the Congress ex-
pressly provides that an appropriation 'shall remain available until ex-
pended,' it constitutes [an appropriation without temporal limits] and
all statutory limits on when the funds may be obligated and expended
are removed."" Thus, the phrase "shall remain available until ex-
pended" does not impose temporal statutory limits in the ordinary
sense; the availability of the funds is not limited to any specific period
of time. However, the plain language clearly supports some limitation
on funding once funds that "shall remain available" have been
"expended."
C. Appropriation Acts under the ISDEAA
The ISDEAA provides that the Secretary will fund self-
determination contracts by providing the secretarial amount in addi-
tion to an amount designated for contract support costs," as has been
explained above." This amount is authorized by the ISDEAA, but ac-
tually disbursed to Native American tribes through appropriation acts
82 See id at 6-6 to 6-7.
83 See id at 5-3 (noting that "shall remain available" and "shall be available" are both ren-
dered meaningless absent express indication in the appropriation itself that the amount available
is not to exceed a specified amount).
84 See id at 6-6 to 6-8.
85 See 31 USC § 1350.
86 Matter of. The Honorable Thad Cochran, 1996 WL 290140, *1 (Comp Gen) (administra-
tive report) (emphasis added).
87 See 25 USC § 450j-l(a)(1) ("The amount of funds provided under the terms of self-
determination contracts entered into pursuant to this subchapter shall not be less than the ap-
propriate Secretary would have otherwise provided.").
88 See 25 USC § 450j-1(a)(2) ("There shall be added to the [secretarial amount] contract
support costs.").
89 See Part II.A.
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that designate specific amounts of money to fund Native American
programming for a specific period of time, typically one year.'
Numerous provisions of the ISDEAA make clear that the
ISDEAA defers to appropriation acts. For example, the ISDEAA
provides that the terms of a self-determination contract "shall be sub-ject to the availability of appropriations."" Pursuant to the Reduction
Clause, funds provided for self-determination contracts can be re-
duced if there has been a "reduction in appropriations from the previ-
ous fiscal year for the program or function to be contracted."9 In the
Availability Clause, the ISDEAA provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision in this subchapter, the pro-
vision of funds under this subchapter is subject to the availability
of appropriations and the Secretary is not required to reduce
funding for programs, projects, or activities serving a tribe to
make funds available to another tribe or tribal organization un-
der this subchapter. 3
An appropriation act authorized by the ISDEAA designates
funding for "initial or expanded" and "ongoing" self-determination
contracts." An initial or expanded self-determination contract is a self-
determination contract that began during the fiscal year of the rele-
vant appropriation act.9' An ongoing self-determination contract is a
self-determination contract that continued from fiscal years before the
relevant appropriation act.0
Initial and expanded self-determination contracts are funded
in appropriation acts through the line item for the Indian Self-
Determination Fund. The Indian Self-Determination Fund was estab-
lished in fiscal year 1988 to designate specific funds for the additional
contract support costs that result when tribes contract for initial and
expanded self-determination contracts. '
Appropriation acts authorized by the ISDEAA designate money
specifically to fund contract support costs." Thus, contract support
90 See General Accounting Office, 1 Principles of Federal Appropriations Law at 2-33, 5-2
(cited in note 17).
91 25 USC § 450j(c)(1).
92 25 USC § 450j-l(b)(2)(A).
93 25 USC § 450j-1(b).
94 See, for example, Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996,
Pub L No 104-134, 110 Stat 1321, 1321-170.
95 See Thompson 11, 334 F3d at 1087.
96 See id.
97 See Continuing Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1988, Pub L No 100-202, 101 Stat 1329,1329-
245 (1987) (earmarking $2.5 million "for the establishment of an Indian Self-Determination
Fund").
98 See Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, 110 Stat at1321-170, which provides that the Bureau of Indian Affairs receive $1,384,434,000 for the con-
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costs incurred by Native American tribes in carrying out self-
determination contracts are to be funded from the amount appropri-
ated specifically for the contract support costs line-item.
In recognition of the fact that numerous tribes would compete for
funding, the ISDEAA provides that "payments of any grants or under
any contracts pursuant to [the ISDEAA] ... may be made ... in such
installments and on such conditions as the appropriate Secretary
deems necessary to carry out the purposes of this [Act]."'" In order to
manage these competing requests, the Indian Health Service estab-
lished a priority list based on the date the tribe requested funding for
a self-determination contract. ' Those tribes at the top of the priority
list would be fully funded until the funding for contract support costs
was depleted, while those at the bottom of the priority list would re-
main on the list of contracts to be funded the following year.' Tribes
that were not funded in full for contract support costs because their
priority was low have filed suit to demand full funding, forcing courts
to wrestle with the task of interpreting and applying the ISDEAA.
III. DIVISIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE ISDEAA
The interpretation and application of the ISDEAA has generated
disagreement among circuit courts. Because the ISDEAA and the ap-
propriation acts authorized by the ISDEAA operate in tandem to
provide Native American tribes with the opportunity for self-
determination,'. two issues divide the courts, creating a two-layered
split. The first layer concerns the language in appropriation acts au-
thorized by the ISDEAA-"shall remain available until expended."
As has been shown, the ISDEAA operates by reference to an author-
struction, repair, and improvement of Indian housing:
[O]f which not to exceed $100,255,000 shall be for welfare assistance grants and not to ex-
ceed $104,626,000 shall be for payments to tribes and tribal organizations for contract sup-
port costs associated with ongoing contracts or grants or compacts entered into with the
Bureau of Indian Affairs prior to fiscal year 1996, as authorized by the Indian Self-
Determination Act of 1975, as amended, and up to $5,000,000 shall be for the Indian Self-
Determination Fund, which shall be available for the transitional cost of initial or expanded
tribal contracts, grants, compacts, or cooperative agreements with the Bureau of Indian Af-
fairs under the provisions of the Indian Self-Determination Act.
Id (emphasis added).
99 25 USC § 450j(b).
100 See Thompson 1, 311 F3d at 1058.
101 See id:
Each year [Indian Health Services] would fully pay for [contract support costs] for new or
expanded contracts at the top of the priority fist, and continue down the list until [funds
were] fully depleted. Contracts that had been so funded were removed from the list, and
those below [them] advanced.
t02 See 25 USC § 450j-1(b) ("[Tihe provision of funds under this Act is subject to the avail-
ability of appropriations.").
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ized appropriation act. 3 Thus, the disagreement among courts regard-
ing the "shall remain available until expended" language in an
ISDEAA authorized appropriation act triggers a second layer of divi-
sion among the circuits regarding the language of the ISDEAA's
Availability Clause.
This Part examines how the Federal Circuit departed from the
approach taken by the Ninth and Tenth Circuits in responding to de-
mands by Native American tribes for money exceeding the amount
specified in an appropriation act. First, this Part sets forth the dis-
agreement on the meaning of the phrase found in the appropriation
act-"shall remain available until expended." Second, this Part will
explain exactly how the Federal Circuit disagrees with the Ninth and
Tenth Circuits concerning the ISDEAA itself.
A. The Appropriation Act Language Split
The first disagreement between the Federal Circuit and the Ninth
and Tenth Circuits involves the words, "shall remain available until
expended," which appeared in an appropriation act authorized by the
ISDEAA. °'
1. Separating "shall remain available" from "until expended":
the Federal Circuit's view.
In Thompson II, the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma had entered
into self-determination contracts with the Secretary of Health and Hu-
man Services to operate "hospitals, health clinics, dental services, men-
tal health programs, and alcohol and substance abuse programs," all
formerly operated by the Secretary.'O The Cherokee Nation brought a
claim against the Secretary for nonpayment of the full amount of con-
tract support costs.'-
The relevant appropriation act provided, in its appropriation of
funds for Indian Health Services,'°5 that "of the funds provided,
$7,500,000 shall remain available until expended, for the Indian Self-
Determination Fund, which shall be available for the transitional costs
103 See Part II.C.
104 See Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, 110 Stat at
1321-189.
105 Thompson H1,334 F3d at 1081.
106 See id at 1082 ("[The Cherokee Nation alleged] that the Secretary had not paid the full
indirect costs to which it was entitled.").
107 Indian Health Services is an arm of the Department of Health and Human Services.
Thus, when the ISDEAA directs the Secretary of Health and Human Services to enter into self-
determination contracts with Indian tribes, this governs Indian Health Services as well. See 25
USC §§ 450b(i), 450f(a)(1).
2004]
The University of Chicago Law Review
of initial or expanded tribal contracts."'' The Federal Circuit held that
because there were no statutory caps in the appropriation act that
governed the self-determination contract between the Cherokee Na-
tion of Oklahoma and the Secretary, the Secretary could not refuse to
pay the contract support costs demanded, which totaled $7,040,358.52.
This amount did not exceed the total funds appropriated. Neverthe-
less, appropriation of this amount would usually trigger the Reduction
Clause of § 450j-1(b), because fulfilling the Cherokee Nation's request
would leave only $459,641.48 in funding for contract support costs for
all other self-determination contracts governed by the same appro-
priation act, requiring a reduction of funds for programs serving other
tribes. '
The Federal Circuit held that "shall remain available" was clearly
not a statutory cap but instead was an unambiguous "carryover provi-
sion." A carryover provision is an allowance for funding to be used in
the following fiscal year from the fiscal year of the appropriation act
in which the carryover provision appears."' If "$7,500,000 shall remain
available" signified a carryover provision, then $7,500,000 would have
been available for the same purpose (the funding of contract support
costs) during the year that the appropriation act applied and the year
after. Whereas if "$7,500,000 shall remain available" refers to a statu-
tory cap, as the Ninth Circuit held in Shoshone-Bannock and the
Tenth Circuit held in Thompson I, then once $7,500,000 was spent on
contract support costs, the amount appropriated for contract support
costs would no longer be available.
Because Thompson H involved an appropriation act that stated
that funds "shall remain available" and not that funds were "not to ex-
ceed" a particular amount, the Federal Circuit reasoned that Thomp-
son H should be distinguished from its earlier decision in Babbitt v
Oglala Sioux Tribal Public Safety Department."' As described in Part
II.B, "shall remain available" does not by itself constitute a statutory
cap, a carryover provision, or any other sort of meaningful 
mandate.12
108 Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996,110 Stat at 1321-189.
109 See Thompson 11, 334 F3d at 1083.
110 See id at 1090 ("The phrase 'shall remain available' ... [has been] consistently inter-
preted, not as a statutory cap on funding ... but as an authorization of 'carry over authority,' in-
dicating that unexpended funds 'shall remain available' for the same purpose during the succeed-
ing fiscal year.").
111 194 F3d 1374,1378-80 (Fed Cir 1999). Thompson I noted that the applicable appropria-
tion act in Oglala Sioux contained explicitly restrictive language, namely the phrase "not to ex-
ceed," thereby imposing a statutory cap. See Thompson H1, 334 F3d at 1084-85. The appropria-
tion act in Thompson 11 on the other hand used the phrase "shall remain available," which, the
court reasoned, imposed no such restriction on funding. See id at 1090. Therefore, unlike the re-
sult in Oglala Sioux, Thompson 11 did not excuse the Secretary from providing contract support
costs in excess of those appropriated. See id.
112 See General Accounting Office, 2 Principles of Federal Appropriations Law at 6-6 to 6-7
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Furthermore, the cases upon which the Federal Circuit relied to de-
termine that "shall remain available" was not a statutory cap involved
appropriation acts in which the words "shall remain available" were
surrounded by more significant language that indicated the phrase
was meant to be a carryover provision.' Therefore, the Federal Cir-
cuit could not have meant that "shall remain available" had a clear
meaning when this phrase appeared in an appropriation act absent
explanatory language.
2. "Shall remain available until expended": the Ninth and Tenth
Circuits' view.
In holding that "shall remain available" constituted an unambi-
guous carryover provision and not a statutory cap, the Federal Circuit
explicitly rejected the approaches of the Ninth and Tenth Circuits.", In
the Federal Circuit decision in Thompson II, as well as in the Ninth
Circuit decision in Shoshone-Bannock and the Tenth Circuit decision
in Thompson I, self-determination contracts were governed by an ap-
propriation act that stated that funding "shall remain available until
expended.'.. In each case, the amount demanded in contract support
costs exceeded the amount appropriated for contract support costs.
In the Ninth Circuit, for example, the Shoshone-Bannock tribe
took over administration from Indian Health Services of various
health care programs on the Fort Hall Reservation in Idaho and de-
manded money for contract support costs pursuant to a self-
determination contract governed by the same appropriation act that
applied in Thompson H."' Because giving the Shoshone-Bannock tribe
the full amount of its requested contract support costs exceeded the
amount of contract support costs appropriated for all tribes for that
(cited in note 75) (observing that courts have followed no firm rule in interpreting the phrase
"shall be available" when it appears on its own).
113 See, for example, Massachusetts Department of Education v United States Department of
Education, 837 F2d 536,538-39 (1st Cir 1988) (holding that a provision of the General Education
Provisions Act that stated that "any funds from appropriations ... shall remain available for ob-
ligation and expenditure by such agencies and institutions during such succeeding fiscal year"
was a carryover provision obligating expenditures for the succeeding fiscal year), cited in
Thompson 11, 334 F3d at 1090. See also Wilson v Watt, 703 F2d 395,400 (9th Cir 1983) (interpret-
ing an ISDEAA-authorized appropriation act that explicitly described the funding power it was
bestowing as "carryover authority" to be a carryover provision rather than a statutory cap).
114 See Thompson II, 334 F3d at 1090 ("We conclude that the Ninth and Tenth Circuit deci-
sions were incorrect [in their interpretation of 'shall remain available'].").
115 See id at 1089-90; Thompson 1, 311 F3d at 1059; Shoshone-Bannock, 279 F3d at 665. All
three cases refer to the Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, 110
Stat 1321.
116 See Shoshone-Bannock, 279 F3d at 665.
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year, the court held that the full amount of contract support costs
need not have been awarded, pursuant to § 450j-1(b). "'
The Tenth Circuit concluded similarly that the Shoshone-Paiute
tribe and the Cherokee Nation were not entitled to the full amount of
their demands for contract support costs when such demands ex-
ceeded the amount appropriated for contract support costs.118 Each
self-determination contract entered into under the ISDEAA must ei-
ther contain or incorporate by reference the provisions of a model
agreement prescribed by § 4501(a) of the ISDEAA."' Accordingly, the
self-determination contracts entered into between the Secretary and
the Shoshone-Paiute and Cherokee tribes each conditioned funding
on the availability of appropriated funds.'2
The Ninth and Tenth Circuits therefore both held that "shall re-
main available until expended" constituted a statutory cap that ex-
cused the Secretary from providing funds in excess of the amount
specified in the relevant appropriation act.1
B. The Split about the Role of § 450j-l(b) in the ISDEAA
The Federal Circuit departed aggressively from its sister circuits'
approach in interpreting the ISDEAA. The statutory cap has one ma-
jor function in the context of the ISDEAA: to trigger the Availability
and Reduction Clause limitations in § 450j-l(b) of the ISDEAA.'1 As
a result, the real effect of the Federal Circuit's holding that "shall re-
main available" was an unambiguous carryover provision was to
117 See Shoshone-Bannock,279 F3d at 667.
118 See Thompson 1,311 F3d at 1058-59.
119 See Part II.A.
120 See Thompson I, 311 F3d at 1057 (noting that the Shoshone-Paiute contract provided
that funding was "subject only to the appropriation of funds," and the Cherokee contract pro-
vided that "funding in this Agreement is subject to adjustment due to Congressional action in
appropriations Acts or other laws affecting availability of funds to the Indian Health Service and
the Department of Health and Human Services").
121 See Shoshone-Bannock, 279 F3d at 666-67; Thompson 1,311 F3d at 1064-65.
122 In this way, § 450j-l(b) serves as the "lever" in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investiga-
tions, which states: "'I set the brake up by connecting up rod and lever.' - Yes, given the whole
of the rest of the mechanism. Only in conjunction with that is it a brake-lever, and separated
from its support it is not even a lever; it may be anything, or nothing." Ludwig Wittgenstein, Phi-
losophical Investigations, Part I, § 6 at 5 (Blackwell 2d ed 2000). In this cryptic passage Wittgen-
stein identified the common tendency to define terminology without regard for its context. Just
as the "lever," when "separated from its support," its brake, or its car, "may be anything, or noth-
ing," so too the statutory cap may be anything, or nothing, when separated from the context of
§ 450j-1(b) of the ISDEAA. The Federal Circuit, in arguing that the issue in Thompson II con-
cerned nothing more than a disagreement about whether "shall remain available" constituted a
statutory cap, attempted to disconnect lever from brake. If the Federal Circuit opinion is to be
read seriously, it must be read with an eye toward its context: § 450j-1(b) of the ISDEAA.
123 See Thompson I, 334 F3d at 1090 ("Such language is commonly understood as a carry-
over provision, not a statutory cap.").
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construe the ISDEAA in such a way as to preclude an avenue by
which § 450j-1(b) could apply.
Two competing views emerge from the actual subject matter of
the Federal Circuit's disagreement with the Ninth and Tenth Circuits.
The first of these views, promoted by the Federal Circuit, is that
§ 450j-l(b) cannot be reconciled with the rest of the provisions in the
ISDEAA and should be read out of the ISDEAA.124 The second view,
promoted by the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, was that § 450j-l(b) should
be taken seriously as a restriction on the provision of funds to Native
American tribes with whom the Secretary has entered into self-
determination contracts, when contract support costs demanded by
these Native American tribes exceed the amount appropriated for
contract support costs in the relevant appropriation act.
1. The ISDEAA cannot be read consistently with § 450j-l(b).
If the reasoning of the Federal Circuit is taken seriously, § 450j-1(b)
should be read out of the ISDEAA based on an argument rooted in
the "purpose" of the ISDEAA and a canon of construction applicable
to Native American legislation. The purpose of the ISDEAA, the pro-
ponents of this view urge, was to provide Native American tribes with
leadership and independence. Such leadership and independence can
only be achieved through the provision of funds. For this reason,
the mandate to provide contract support costs, in addition to the sec-
retarial amount, for self-determination contracts was added to the
ISDEAA in 1988. Funding must be unlimited, according to this view,
because if a Native American tribe is left without any contract support
costs, that tribe will not be able to exercise its right to plan, conduct,
and administer programs pursuant to its self-determination contract
with the federal government.
A special canon of construction instructs that federal statutes re-
lating to Native Americans should be construed liberally in favor of
Native Americans, with ambiguous provisions interpreted to their
benefit. ' 6 This canon of construction is "rooted in the unique trust re-
lationship between the United States and the Indians.' '.. Using that
canon, the Federal Circuit and its supporters plausibly argue that am-
124 Some have urged a similar, though somewhat more aggressive, view-namely that the
ISDEAA should be amended to expunge the Availability Clause. See Dean and Webster, 36
Tulsa L J at 375-76 (cited in note 34).
125 See id at 352.
126 See Ramah Navajo Chapter v Lujan, 112 F3d 1455, 1461 (10th Cir 1997) (holding that
the liberal canon of construction in favor of Native Americans controlled over a more general
rule of deference to agency interpretations).
127 County of Oneida v Oneida Indian Nation, 470 US 226,247 (1985).
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biguity in the language of the appropriation bill requires reading
§ 450j-1(b) out of the ISDEAA.
2. The ISDEAA can be read consistently with § 450j-1(b).
The alternative position is that § 450j-l(b) should be read as an
operative component of the ISDEAA, especially when interpreting
the ISDEAA to authorize ambiguous appropriations language such as
"shall remain available," because § 450j-1(b) is an unambiguous, ex-
plicit provision of the ISDEAA. The Tenth Circuit took this position
in Thompson 1 ' The court reasoned that awarding the full amount of
contract support costs to a Native American tribe that demanded
an amount exceeding that appropriated would misinterpret the
ISDEAA, which conditions federal funding upon the availability of
appropriations. 9 The Tenth Circuit reasoned that the language of
§ 450j-1(b) is "clear and unambiguous. ' The court further noted that
"[b]y means of this express language, 'Congress has plainly excluded
the possibility of construing the contract support costs provision as an
entitlement that exists independently of whether Congress appropri-
ates money to cover it."..1 Thus the Ninth and Tenth Circuits read
§ 450j-1(b) of the ISDEAA to mean what it says: "the Secretary need
only distribute the amount of money appropriated by Congress under
the Act, and need not take money intended to serve non-[contract
support cost] purposes under the [ISDEAA] in order to meet his re-
sponsibility to allocate [contract support costs]."32
IV. RECONCILING THE PURPOSE OF THE INDIAN
SELF-DETERMINATION AND EDUCATION ASSISTANCE ACT
WITH § 450j-1(b)
The Federal Circuit's departure from the interpretations of the
ISDEAA put forth by the Ninth and Tenth Circuits is contrary to the
plain language and purpose of the ISDEAA as well as general princi-
ples of appropriations law. Therefore, in this Part, I argue that the sec-
ond of the two competing views, explained in Part III.B.2, should gov-
ern the interpretation of the ISDEAA.
128 311 F3d at 1061.
129 Id ("As [§ 450j-1 (b)] plainly states, the 'provision of funds' is 'subject to the availability of
appropriations."').
130 Id, citing Oglala Sioux, 194 F3d at 1378.
131 Thompson 1, 311 F3d at 1061, quoting Shoshone-Bannock, 279 F3d at 665.
132 Thompson 1, 311 F3d at 1061, quoting Ramah Navajo School Board, 87 F3d at 1345.
[71:16371656
Reconciling Purpose and Text under the ISDEAA
A. The Purpose of the ISDEAA Is Not Hampered by § 450j-1(b)
Proponents of the position that the ISDEAA should be read
without § 450j-1(b) argue that if "shall remain available" is not a
carryover provision and not a statutory cap based on its plain lan-
guage alone, it is certainly intended to be a carryover provision when
read against the backdrop of the history of the ISDEAA.
The ISDEAA remedied federal domination over planning, con-
ducting, and administering Native American programming. That the
ISDEAA provides for Native American tribes to spend money to do
the same things that the federal government spent money to do is in-
cidental to the essence of the ISDEAA; the ISDEAA is primarily a
transfer of responsibility, not of money. Despite this fundamental goal,
defenders of Thompson II argue that the transfer of responsibility to
Native American tribes less experienced than the federal government
in the arena of planning, conducting, and administering programs re-
quires the expenditure of all transactional costs incident to the execu-
tion of self-determination contracts. ' The ISDEAA, however, pro-
vides that funding is contingent upon the availability of funds. In this
way the ISDEAA is in the company of many other similar provisions
in the United States Code. Congress commonly conditions its funding
upon the availability of such funding, and an exception should not be
made to such a practice for Native American tribes.
Native American funding has already been treated differently
from other federal funding through the amendments to the ISDEAA
that provide contract support costs to Native American tribes. These
contract support costs were intended to promote the feasibility of Na-
tive American tribes' exercising their responsibility to plan, conduct,
and administer their own projects.'
Furthermore, the Reduction Clause in § 450j-l(b) does not neces-
sarily impair the ability of Native American tribes to achieve inde-
pendence and leadership. Through § 450j-1(b) and prioritized fund-
ing,'33 Native American tribes may be forced to compete for the com-
plete funding of their contract support costs, which may in turn foster
collaboration among Native American tribes and bring independence
from federal subsidy. If Native American tribes are aware that only
some tribes will win funding, projects among the tribes may be con-
solidated.
133 See Dean and Webster, 36 Tulsa L J at 353-55 (cited in note 34) (quoting a 1999 report
by the GAO finding that "[s]hortfalls in funding for contract support have adversely affected
tribes in various ways").
134 See Part 1.
135 See notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
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On the other hand, one could argue that the ISDEAA has
successfully done away with the trusteeship between the federal gov-
ernment and Native American tribes.'- The eradication of this rela-
tionship was the principal motivation driving the enactment of the
ISDEAA. To the extent that the ISDEAA, along with § 450j-1(b),
has successfully accomplished its intended goal,' 37 no basis exists upon
which to challenge Congress's inclusion of a standard availability
clause. Absent a challenge to Congress's inclusion of a standard avail-
ability clause, § 450j-l(b) must be read as its inclusion in the ISDEAA
plainly demands.
Congress places conditions on funding to ensure that it does not
obligate itself in excess of an allowance provided for in an annual ap-
propriation act.'" The ISDEAA defers to appropriation acts for the
actual provision of funds, and so a clause in the ISDEAA that condi-
tions funding on appropriations is a sensible provision.
B. "Shall Remain Available" Language in an Appropriation Act
Urges a Reading of the ISDEAA That Includes § 450j-1(b)
Appropriation acts that apply to self-determination contracts are
authorized by the ISDEAA.'39 Often, though not always, Congress
passes an authorizing act before passing the appropriation act.'" The
ISDEAA is an example of this; it was enacted before the 1996 appro-
priation act that was at issue in the Federal, Ninth, and Tenth Circuit
decisions discussed in this Comment. The significance of an authoriz-
ing act coming before an appropriation act is that an appropriation
act's language very conceivably might mirror the language of its ear-
lier authorizing act.
Often, an appropriation act explicitly incorporates other legisla-
tion, notably substantive legislation.' For example, in the appropria-
tion for ACTION, a program provided for by the Department of La-
bor and former Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, "' the
136 See Dean and Webster, 36 Tulsa L J at 353-55 (cited in note 34) ("[I]mposition of such a
penalty on tribes who exercise their self-determination rights is inconsistent with Congress'
commitment to 'supporting ... strong and stable tribal governments."').
137 The ISDEAA has been described as "the most successful Indian policy [ever] adopted
by the United States." Id at 350 (quoting the chairman of the Miccosukee tribe in a statement be-
fore the House Resource Committee).
138 See Stith, 97 Yale L J at 1353 (cited in note 46).
139 See 25 USC § 450j-1(b).
140 See General Accounting Office, 1 Principles of Federal Appropriations Law at 2-35
(cited in note 17) (stating that "the typical sequence is: (1) organic legislation, (2) authorization
of appropriations, if not contained in the organic legislation, and (3) the appropriation act").
141 See Stith, 97 Yale L J at 1353.
142 See Departments of Labor, Health, Education and Welfare Appropriations Act, Pub L
No 94-439,90 Stat 1418,1434 (1976).
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appropriation act stated: "For expenses necessary for ACTION to
carry out the provisions of the Domestic Volunteer Service Act of
1973, as amended, $108,200,000..''.
The phrase, "shall remain available," has little if any significance
on its own. 4 The GAO suggests that modifying words are necessary to
give the phrase a particular meaning.'4' The phrase "shall remain avail-
able" in an appropriation act does not signify any particular type of
appropriations provision. The Federal Circuit incorrectly concluded
that the phrase "shall remain available" on its own conveyed any
meaning at all. Therefore, to interpret this phrase in the appropriation
act authorized by the ISDEAA, more information is necessary. A bet-
ter interpretation of the appropriation language would take into ac-
count the entire phrase "shall remain available until expended." The
"until expended" language indicates that funding should remain avail-
able until expended. Of course, then, once the funding was expended,
the funding would cease to remain available.
Looking to the overall structure of the funding scheme for Na-
tive American tribes may provide some context. The phrase "shall re-
main available" in the appropriation act is nearly identical to a similar
phrase in § 450j-1(b) in the ISDEAA.
The Availability Clause of § 450j-1(b) states that funding is con-
tingent on the fact that funds to expend remain in an annual appro-
priation. "Shall remain available until expended" means that funds
can be granted until those funds have been spent. The similarity be-
tween the two provisions is unsurprising in light of the contingency of
the phrase, "shall remain available," and in light of the fact that the
1996 appropriation act was authorized by the ISDEAA. Under this in-
terpretation of "shall remain available until expended," this phrase
promotes a reading of the ISDEAA that includes § 450j-1(b), because
its Availability Clause was directly reflected in the appropriation act
authorized by the ISDEAA.
C. The Federal Circuit's Holding in Thompson II Conflicts with
General Principles of Appropriations Law
In Thompson II, the Federal Circuit endorsed a reading of the
ISDEAA that is inconsistent with the general principles of appropria-
tions law set forth by the GAO. Yet, the Federal Circuit employed
these same principles in establishing six less controversial propositions
143 Id.
144 See Part II.B.
145 See General Accounting Office, 2 Principles of Federal Appropriations Law at 6-6, 6-7
(cited in note 75) (noting that whether "shall be available" is used in conjunction with phrases
such as "not to exceed" or "not less than" is an important factor in interpreting congressional
appropriations).
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in Thompson H, such as the proposition that "Congress generally uses
standard phrases to impose a statutory cap."'' 6 While the GAO's inter-
pretation certainly is not binding authority on the Federal Circuit or
any other court, it seems odd for the Federal Circuit to disregard the
GAO principles when it has referred to them in the past as "expert
opinion[s], which we should prudently consider.' '.. Contrary to the
Federal Circuit's view, the GAO explains that "shall remain available"
has little, if any, interpretive value on its own, and is not clearly a
carryover provision or a statutory cap. 14
Ultimately, the appropriation act language in Thompson H was
not materially different from the appropriation act language in Oglala
Sioux, where the appropriation act itself contained the words "not to
exceed."''49 "Shall remain available" is not as clearly a statutory cap as
is "not to exceed," but the Federal Circuit did not convincingly distin-
guish between the two phrases such that a departure from the Federal
Circuit's prior holding and from the Ninth and Tenth Circuit ap-
proaches was warranted.
CONCLUSION
The ISDEAA must be read consistent with its plain language.
That plain language includes § 450j-l(b) as a condition to the funding
of self-determination contracts. To draft exceptions to funding into a
statute is Congress's right, and it is outside the province of the courts
to construe a statute like the ISDEAA in a manner clearly inconsis-
tent with the plain meaning of the statute. The effectuation of the pur-
pose of the ISDEAA is not hindered by § 450j-l(b) because the pur-
pose of the ISDEAA is the eradication of the federal government's
dominance over Native American programming and the entrustment
of that responsibility in the hands of Native American tribes. Because
the plain language and purpose of the ISDEAA do not require
any departure from longstanding principles of appropriations law,
§ 450j-l(b) must be treated with the same deference as every other
provision of the ISDEAA.
146 Thompson , 334 F3d at 1084, citing General Accounting Office, 2 Principles of Federal
Appropriations Law at 6-4 (cited in note 75).
147 Thompson H, 334 F3d at 1084, citing Delta Data Systems Corp v Webster, 744 F2d 197,
201 (DC Cir 1984).
148 See General Accounting Office, 2 Principles of Federal Appropriations Law at 6-6, 6-7
(noting that if "shall be available" is used on its own, the rules regarding its interpretation are
unclear).
149 See 194 F3d at 1376 (observing that the appropriation act at issue appropriated $1.5
billion for Native American programs "of which not to exceed $95,823,000 shall be for payments
... for contract support costs"), quoting Interior Appropriations Act of 1995, Pub L No 103-332,
108 Stat 2499, 2511 (1994).
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